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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCAnON 
American education today is governed by an outcome-based paradigm. Teachers 
and students alike are evaluated and determined by their scores on standardized tests, 
which articulate how the assessment of skills and information have overwhelmingly 
become the sole basis for an educated person. Students are treated like receptacles for 
knowledge that they only find outside of themselves, in the teacher or class material. 
They are not given a free orientation towards the development of their own learning if 
their educative environment already requires that regurgitating answers is the only 
worthwhile educative measure. Likewise, teachers are expected to put skills and 
information inside of students without granting them access towards their own 
pedagogical or curricular prejudices, something that may become the most important 
"outcome" of a healthy education. 
In other words, in an outcome basedi learning environment, both students and 
teachers alike tend to develop an inability to investigate the presuppositions involved in 
their own learning. They will not be capable of the kind of first order thinking ii 
fundamental to human growth and flourishing, because they have fixed their gaze 
towards learning with an unhealthy orientation towards improper goals and standards. 
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The un-educated are those who have not been given a free orientation towards their own 
self-development by being forced into an education that accepts only pre-authorizes 
answers or certain and determinate outcomes. However, if we really want to reform this 
paradigm, then our inquiry might be well served by a critique of this technical prejudice 
which itself does not fall prey to a technical interpretive mode. 
More specifically, public education in the United States is currently based on a 
model of outcome that Paulo Freire has articulated as "the banking model"iii. This model 
of education dominates the pedagogy and curriculum of America's public school system 
with the idea that the process of deposit and withdrawal is the only way to articulate the 
skills and information of schooling. In this kind of educational climate, students are often 
treated as receptacles for the knowledge that comes from the instructor, and are therefore 
not given a free orientation to their own ideas. This articulation of education stifles 
critical thinking, because students are taught to disassociate their educational 
improvement from their experience. The fundamental solution to this problem involves 
the responsibility ofteachersiv to adequately shape the understanding of students and 
articulate an educational philosophy in a way that matches the most effective style of 
classroom pedagogy. 
This thesis project champions Freire's notion of educational praxis by looking to 
the philosophy of the Ancient Greeks, most notably Plato and Aristotle, whose 
philosophic claims seek to rehabilitate education from the banking model. However, the 
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focus of this project is not about how Plato and Aristotle define praxis and how it can be 
contrasted to Freire's educational philosophy. Rather, I think that each figure provides a 
lesson to teachers that can be an example ofwhat Freire wants from the idea of 
educational praxis. In this regard, my reading of Plato's Republic provides teachers with 
the insight that understanding student learning is intimately connected to their character. 
The notion of character that will be esteemed from this encounter with Platonic dialogue 
will give a rich understanding of how the teacher/student relation is founded on healthy 
dialogue, and how such dialogue may provide the possibility for the improvement of 
character. Such improvement is one way that teachers can think about what education 
entails in a way that eliminates the banking model of education. 
The second insight of this project is that teachers can avoid and eliminate the 
banking model of education by being attentive to the methodology of Aristotle's 
philosophy, most notably in his analysis of \jfUXll or "soul". Indeed, it is the inquiry into 
the soul that most of all shows educators a language that cannot be collapsed within the 
banking model of education, because it involves a relation to impasses of our ordinary 
experience that cannot, and should not, be resolved. These impasses should be respected 
and articulated well by teachers who seek a self-reflective attitude towards education that 
is based on humility. Furthermore, by understanding Aristotle's insistence that any 
method should always be in agreement with its subject matter, and that inquiry involves 
relative precision, teachers can learn to be careful facilitators of student learning in a way 
that fosters Freire's notion of educational praxis. 
4 
Before we can understand how these two Ancient Greek insights can help 
teachers eliminate the banking model of education, this model should be carefully 
articulated and its motivation explained in the way that Freire does in his text, Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed. Here, Freire begins his analysis by articulating how a liberating 
pedagogy can help to destroy the forces of de-humanization that are institutionalized by a 
certain mode of educational practice. He sees this process of de-humanization to be 
largely operative through forces of oppression, forces that require revolutionary 
transformation. Freire explains the central concern of his pedagogy by saying the 
following about the identity of oppressed peoples, which for our purposes will are 
students in the public education system ofthe United States: 
As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be 
like is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible. The 
pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that 
both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization. 
(POE,33) 
In this passage, Freire illustrates the inner-conflict of the oppressed, yet also describes 
how the oppressed and the oppressor articulate a higher dichotomy between each other. 
Students are oppressed, because they have been systematically educated that the only 
basis for their identity can be found in the likeness and comparison to those who seek to 
dominate and de-humanize them. 
On the other hand, Freire's pedagogy seeks to address how both the oppressed 
and the oppressor contribute to the environment of oppression. Understanding education 
is this way would mean that, more often than not, teachers take the role of the oppressor 
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when they teach with the banking model. In other words, the pedagogy of the oppressed 
offers people the realization that the process of replacement or reversal does nothing to 
change the situation of de-humanization, because such processes fail to motivate the 
power that oppressed peoples have in restoring their humanity and the humanity of their 
oppressors. Liberation through pedagogy will not simply re-inscribe the environment of 
oppression itself, but rather seeks to transform it. 
Now that we have a better grasp of how liberation motivates Freire's pedagogy, 
we can examine the two models of education he articulates with a more holistic 
perspective. Freire begins his second chapter with the claim that, "education is suffering 
from narration sickness" (POE, 57). In other words, the sickness that the pedagogy of the 
oppressed seeks to remedy involves a teaching environment where students only re­
articulate or memorize instruction thereby learning to disconnect knowledge from their 
lived experience. Under the grip of this sickness, students are taught that knowledge is 
static and therefore can be memorized without question, as a predicable, organized series 
of facts. Freire will say that the banking model champions the concept that "the scope of 
action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing and storing 
deposits" (POE, 64). By teaching students that knowledge and learning are only acts of 
deposit and withdrawal, students will be not allowed to analyze and critique aspects of 
their lived reality. Under the banking model the processes of liberation cannot occur, 
because students are oppressed by being convinced that they hold no stake in their own 
learning. 
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Conversely, Freire articulates an alternative model of education which he 
proposes can effectively alleviate the sicknesses created by the banking model of 
education by connecting students to knowledge by way of their actual experiences. This 
kind of pedagogy abandons the deposit-making process which characterizes the banking 
model of education and replaces it with the posing of problems that are contextualized in 
the lived experience of human reality. He says that this kind of education is, "responding 
to the essence of consciousness - intentionality- rejects communiques and embodies 
communication" (POE, 66). In other words, by posing problems that occur in the daily 
lives of students, the teacher actively demonstrates libratory communication that 
authenticates the consciousness of students in a humane manner. This model of 
education rejects communiques because it does not proceed by speaking to students, but 
rather speaks with students. 
In conclusion, I would like to address a way that I will embrace the problem 
posing method of education and work to eliminate aspects of the banking model. In my 
experience, however, public schools in the u.s. are seemingly dominated by the banking 
approach to education and many educators seem skeptical of any alternative model of 
education. Perhaps one more textual example may help to encourage teachers who wish 
to employ such an alternative. Freire thinks that the place of an instructor in the process 
of liberation is pivotal, but he also expresses caution about how the relationship between 
teacher and student is typically defined. Freire offers a very subtle way of thinking about 
the place ofthe educator by saying, "they talk about the people, but do not trust them; 
and trusting the people is the indispensable precondition for revolutionary change" (POE, 
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46). Here, Freire assumes that social reconstruction is a philosophy that teachers should 
champion, which means that they seek societal transformation on the basis ofjustice and 
equity. Specifically, Freire's claim is that many teachers do not hesitate to offer detailed 
explanations about their students or their performance in a class and have much to say 
about them. However, Freire seeks to remind them that if trust is not a part of an 
instructor's pedagogy than any type of educative transformation cannot occur. 
Teachers need to spend more time finding ways to trust in their student's success 
and value the diversity of their experiences by spending less time talking about them or 
to them. Teachers can learn to trust their students by involving them in classroom 
decisions, allowing them to take leadership positions in class, and finding ways to learn 
about them personally. By trusting my students, I hope to convince them that knowledge 
can be relevant to their everyday experiences and interests, which is something that 
allows them an opportunity to liberate themselves from a system that, more often than 
not, only rewards narration and deposit-making. 
Being educated is about knowing the relative precision of different modes of 
inquiry and developing a healthy inertia aimed at self-reflective experience. This is a 
praxis that can be cultivated as a form of raised awareness when teachers deem student 
attention towards their own philosophical presuppositions regarding the presentation of 
skills or information as important as the curriculum. In other words, teachers who think 
that their own views or orientations towards the class material should be thought about in 
the classroom by the students are also those who encourage critical thought. Socrates 
encounters figures in The Republic, who hold opinions about justice that are revealed in 
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dialouge in ways that indicate who they are in terms oftheir charater. In other words, 
Socrates encounters different people who each embody a particular characterization of 
justice, yet who also fail to follow with Socrates in the enabling conditions of their own 
understanding. Here, teachers are left with the insight that following conversation 
involves a person's character and that some people may not be capable of such a 
following on the basis oftheir character. Aristotle's account of'l'uXll demonstrates how 
the innermost movements, activities and potencies of students are mysterious, and require 
a careful methodological inquiry that provides a language for how they stay the same 
through educative change. Teachers should learn Aristotle's account in order to foster a 
reflective attitude towards their pedagogy, which is inherently antithetical to the banking 
model of education. 
Education is in crisis because critical thinking or first order thinking that is 
fundamental to human experience we fail to cultivate its importance to the skills and 
information demonstrated in a classroom. Education based on the idea of fundamental 
thinking gets in the way of outcome based paradigms, which dominate how we 
understand education and its role in being fully human. Outcome based understandings 
of education often ignore the importance of critical thought, because students who do 
question the paradigms' presuppositions only discover the triviality and boredom of 
"knowing the answer", they of course can show just how bad this paradigm is. Teaching 
philosophy to teachers may bring about awareness regarding how skills and information 
are presented and open students towards their own character as they respond and 
contribute to future situations. In this way, teaching is inherently risky, but ethically 
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founded. Learning involves inner-movements of students towards their own self­
understanding in ways that cannot be determined in advance as outcomes. In this way, 
Aristotle's account of "the soul" will provide a language to discuss these inner­
movements. 
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Endnotes 
i An outcome based paradigm of education does not necessarily promote the assessment of students to a 
degree that higher order problem solving skills are diminished or ignored or establish the epistemological 
authority of teacher responsibility. The history of this educational movement has always understood itself 
to offer an entire reshaping of every aspect of American education predicated on tailoring student's 
teachers as life-long learners. "The full potential of outcome-based education will only be achieved if the 
emphasis is on the learning process and not the 'outcome'." 
Brogan, Bernard and Brofan, Walter. "Defining and Debating the Issues: Is Outcome-Based Education the 
Answer?" In 17' Annual Conference ofthe Eastern Educational Research Association, Sarasota, 
FL, February, 1994, p.13. 
ii This kind of thinking is about praxis and its priority in shaping educational pedagogy that leads to 
effective teaching. The Brogan Brothers research on educational philosophy stands alone in the scholarship 
by linking effective pedagogy to the insights of the Ancient Greeks in a way that challenges the banking 
model of education. "It is important to differentiate first-order thinking from the acquisition of skills, 
becoming skilled in thinking so that we can use thinking to achieve other goals. Here thinking is not 
affirmed as worthy in itself; it is not pursused for its own sake as an essential element of human self­
experience." 
Brogan, Bernard and Brogan, Walter. "The Socratic Questioner: Teaching and Learning in the Dialogical 
Classroom" In The Educational Forum, Vol. 59, Spring 1995, p.293. 
iii Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy ofthe Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Continuum, 1970, 
p.53. 
iv "The single most dominate factor affecting student academic gain is the teacher effect." 
Liesveld, Rosanne and Miller Jo Ann. Teaching with Your Strengths. The Gallup Organization, Gallup 
Press: New York, 2005, p.42. 
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CHAPTER II
 
THE TWOFOLD CHARACTER OF \fYXH
 
Methodological Concerns and Introduction 
Aristotle's text ITEPI \fYXHL , On the Soul, is divided into three books, which 
each build upon one another as well as share central concerns and impasses that are 
pivotal for philosophy of education. In the first book Aristotle articulates very important 
methodological caveats as well as demonstrates his remarkable ability to engage thinkers 
who have already spoken about \jrUXll. The second book greatly intensifies many 
concerns of the first, especially in regard to aisthesis. The third book explores potencies 
of \jruX'1 as well as a notion of whole-soul, or world-soul, which holds together life as 
living. Although I will not be able to discuss much of the specific content of each book 
here, my goal is to show continuity between all three books in a way that both 
demonstrates the insight of Aristotle's remarks for the possibility of giving teachers a 
language for the improvement of their teaching, but also champions the possible research 
opportunities that Joe Sachs' new translationi provides. We will see that, for Aristotle, 
being-at-work names how we stay the same throughout educative change and can 
experience kinship with others who are in their own process of learning. 
Another primary focus in this study involves delimiting a central concern related 
to first philosophy out of the array of those brought to light by Aristotle's thinking. I 
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mean first philosophy here in two ways. One is in terms of a study into how our common 
sense harbors non-superficial impasses and presuppositions in the way endoxa always 
harbors aporia. Education names the process of becoming aware of such impasses and 
learning to appreciate and tarry with the existence of such difficulties. First philosophy 
can also be thought of as an inquiry that looks towards the singular while carefully 
holding a vision of the whole to which it belongs intact. This relates to how educational 
philosophy should foster recognition between teachers and students in a way that exposes 
the impasse Aristotle calls, "like is known by like". Aristotle's study "first philosophy" 
as translated by Sachs shows how one could cautiously think Aristotle as a deeply potent 
and careful thinker of impasses taken for granted by our common sense and should be 
endured by careful inquiry. 
We can further develop what first philosophy entails, and how it relates to 
education, by turning to the first book of the Physics when Aristotle gives an account 
regarding how the right road (hodos) into nature (phusis) comes from nature itself. "The 
natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better 
known by nature; for it is not the same things that are known to us and well known 
simpll". In other words, inquiry into nature, as that which most of all is, is least clear 
from our vantage point, yet not utterly unknowable. This impasse involves how the 
division between inquiry and what it knows may be surpassed with the concurrence 
account of \jfUXll. However, according to the outcome based model of education, this 
distinction is ignored, because it cannot think concurrence with the depth and scope that 
Aristotle can. As the nature that we are as creature capable of learning, we require a 
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preliminary awareness regarding how nature always is showing itself to us in a particular 
manner and that the best way to study nature (or even \1f'\)Xll) takes this aspect of inquiry 
seriously. Thinking of inquiry seriously is a fundamental aspect for effective teaching. 
I think that there are at least two impasses of first philosophy in TIEPI 'I'YXHL: a 
notion of concurrence exemplified by the phrase "like is known by like", and impasses of 
motion involving the dialectic of poein (to make or do) and paschein (to suffer or have 
done to one). Each of these difficulties need to be elaborated, as they are for Aristotle 
absolutely vital in speaking about \j1UXll, but they also show a good way towards 
Aristotle's interest and insights specific to the inquiry having \j1UXll as its matter. I will 
touch on the first of these concerns in detail with special reference to all three books of 
TIEPI IPYXHL and conclude with some brief remarks on the relevance of the second. 
Aristotle begins his inquiry into \j1UXll in what may seem to be a rather strange 
way. He opens his discussion by saying the following: 
Since we consider knowledge to be something beautiful and honored, and 
one sort more so than another either on account of its precision or because 
it is about better and more wondrous things, on both these accounts we 
should rank the inquiry of the soul among the primary studies. (OTS, 47) 
It is remarkable that Aristotle does not begin this inquiry with a claim about \j1UXll, but 
rather a claim about knowledge ('tllV Eiomv). He is making an important assumption 
about his audience regarding whether or not they hold knowledge to be worth of beauty 
(kalos) and honor. In other words, if a reader does not consider knowledge to be both 
beautiful and honorable then they will not be able to receive the inquiry into the soul in 
the right way. Aristotle is convincing us that knowledge is something worthy of our 
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esteem, which is a fundamental aspect of teaching in general. In looking towards the 
topic at hand, Aristotle is wondering what kinds of assumptions are being held in the 
"souls" of his readers by stressing the function of familiarity in inquiry. 
If this seems like a foreign or contentious thought, consider the role of arche in 
Aristotelian philosophy and its implications for philosophy of education. Arche means 
ruling origin, and Aristotle is always thinking in a way of setting down a proper and 
determinate beginning that houses still unrealized trajectories. Yet, we still always begin 
our study with what is known to us and not what is known simply. He admits that since 
knowledge is in one way a kind of ruling origin, speaking of psyche is among the most 
primary of inquiries (EV npo:rtOl<; n8Elrn.u:;V). This account proceeds on the assumption 
that all investigators hold inquiry into ",UXll with the highest esteem. 
Aristotle is not concerned with providing static definitions that are deduced from 
a table of categories iii or are simply made up through the abuse of philosophic skoleiv • 
Rather, he is a dialectical thinker who thinks through accounts that have already been 
given about psyche (endoxic ruling origins) in order to arrive at better ones. The effect of 
such a methodology is that our common understandings or opinions about ",UXll are not 
going to be simply dismissed, but returned to with new awareness regarding what the 
matter is with ",UXll. In this way he shares the Socratic concern about hubris by agreeing 
that "it is better to finish a little bit well that a lot inadequatel/". In other words, 
Aristotle inquires into ",UXll in a modest manner that leads careful readers to an 
appreciation for the difficulty of the inquiry itself. In this way he is interested in seeing 
his audience improve their learning by proceeding through an ongoing shared line of 
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thought. Aristotle will often claim in this text, as well as in many others, that the inquiry 
should "stand as marking off and sketching in outline" its proper subject matter. (OTS, 
413a 10) 
A proper philosophical study should yoke its principle matter to its proper 
manner. It should do so in a way that avoids hubris to achieve appreciation for inherent 
difficulties and paradoxes within thinking. In our case, the idea that logos philosophy is 
able to safely provide a determinate mastery of clear and distinct first principles from 
which deductions can be made about 'lfUXl] will be warned against by Aristotle. Instead, 
he stresses again and again that any insights made possible by the outcome of this study 
will be only aimed toward a preliminary awareness or trace of'jruXl]. In a way, Aristotle 
is suggesting an arche for this inquiry, one that understands itself already aimed at a 
chosen purpose (telos) yet still tentative and preliminary. In an early lecture course on 
Aristotle, Heidegger articulates a similar methodological point as "formale Anzeige" or 
preliminary indication. By engaging the concrete problematic inherently raised by asking 
the question as to what philosophy itself is, Heidegger says the following: 
Those who wish to acquaint themselves for the first time with such a 
problematic need a preliminary rough indication of the direction the 
investigation will take, just in order to carry out the first step in a definite, 
even if unsteady, lighe l • 
In other words, the very task of philosophy involves those who orient their insight 
towards inquiry in a way that still preserves their prior familiarity with questioning. This 
is a kind of clue that the investigators will already need to possess in order to help sort 
out which direction the questioning shall lead. Heidegger is saying that if an original 
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exposure with philosophy's self-questioning can occur, it will already have the 
requirement of having a "formale Anzeige". 
It is important for our purposes to mention that this methodological point of 
Heidegger's mirrors Aristotle's prerequisite that all inquiry into 'l'UXll be preceded by an 
appreciation for the highest, most beautiful, and most honorable of things known. In 
other words, both thinkers recognize that familiarity & insight is prior and necessary to 
knowing in general. Indeed, many scholars have shown that it is nous and its divergence 
from logos that serves as both Aristotle's innovation over the Platonic account of truth 
and dialectic and Heidegger's link to Aristotlevii . Our study simply needs to link how 
insight is the preceding appreciation for the soul. 
Not unlike Heidegger, Aristotle does not simply mark off this methodological 
point. Rather, he interrogates it further in the following manner: 
But first, perhaps, it is necessary to decide in which general class it is, and 
what it is - I mean whether it is an independent thing and a this, or a 
quality or quantity or some other one of the distinct ways of attributing 
being to anything, or further whether it belongs among things having 
being in potency or is rather some sort of being-at-work-staying-itself; for 
this makes no small difference. (OTS, 402 b) 
This passage is not just repeating a caveat to the audience regarding how their aesthetic 
attunement towards understanding psyche is necessary, but makes a claim about a 
fundamental aspect for effective teaching. They should recognize that even though a 
given being can be articulated in a multifarious manner, a choice is required as to which 
type of questioning is most appropriate to it. What is of particular interest here is that the 
equivocation of ousia (thinghood) and tode ti (a this) shows the impossibility of 
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distinguishing \jIUXll in terms of either one. Rather, the claim is that both are only one 
way of seeking \jI'UXll well. 
Tode ti can be translated as "a this", but it can also be understood as "a certain 
something", naming a particularity that stands out from the background of other brings by 
way of perception. It demonstrates how something at hand shows itself. Sachs speaks of 
the tode ti as, "that which comes forth to meet perception as a ready-made independent 
whole" (OTS, 202). Sachs is speaking of the way a this comes to show itself as the thing 
that it is without being cut into a sum of parts, without being a mere heap. Aristotle 
yokes thinghood with a-certain-something here because he wants to think \jIUXll in terms 
of how its enduring presence shows itself as the thing it is. Yet if the appearance of \jI'uXll 
is its thinghood, this look is itself always inherently linked to the body, crWl!(X (soma), 
which is certainly a this capable of yielding to many different forms of predication. 
Difficult still since ousia cannot be understood categorically in terms of attributesviii. In 
other words, every particular living body has unique attributes that are not solely 
predicated on its being alive, or alive-ness that keeps it being the being that it is. 
Aristotle is curious as to how this character of\jluXll, as en-souled, points towards the 
richness of its giveness, even when the desire for a logos of this singular in its finitude 
and uniqueness seems much too difficult to attain. 
What is interesting is that by yoking thinghood and "a this" together, Aristotle is 
able to distinguish \jIUXll in terms of its nature ('tl]V 'tE <pumv) and well as from its 
attributes ({Stu 1tu81l) (OTS, 402A 8-9). Aristotle wants to ask how the attributes of the 
\jIUXll properly belong to it and what the character of this distinction is. Even if we ignore 
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the confusion of thinking how nature or thinghood could be predicates or things \lr6X,11 
could have, we could still ask what the difference is between addressing \!luX'll as in terms 
of its nature or its thinghood. What is the shared ground of the attributes, nature and 
thinghood of the soul in terms ofa shared ground (unuPX8w)? An answer could be that 
Aristotle sees this inquiry as absolutely tied to first philosophy insofar as that study is 
always aimed at the understanding the manifold character of being that nevertheless still 
points towards a shared ground, or pros henix The worry over the infinite regress of logos 
points it way to the support of independent thinghood as the grounding moment of 
articulation. 
In this way Aristotle issues a warning to his students early on in this first book by 
saying: 
But if there is not some one common method for pursuing what something is, 
the work we have taken in hand becomes still more difficult, since it will 
require that we get hold of some way of approaching each particular thing. 
(OTS, 402a 17) 
In other words, Aristotle intensifies these methodological difficulties by warning that our 
inquiry can easily lead to an infinite regress. We are not being barred from seeking a 
single method for the knowledge of everything, but Aristotle certainly seems to suggest 
that this way of proceeding is mostly out of reach and improper for an inquiry into 
psyche. If we agree that the world we inhabit is not reducible to a unity without 
differentiation, a mere blob, then we are then forced to tum to a way of proceeding that 
can get a hold of each particular on the way towards this whole, as a ground for our 
inquiry that is strangely withheld. Of course, we cannot gain insight into each particular 
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thing either, especially if we seek an account of \jIUXll that stays on track in accordance 
with philosophical skole. This inquiry demands a certain kind of urgency that will not 
tolerate speaking of every thing that there is in order to gain clarity about \jIUXll. Aristotle. 
is wondering how we could be already treating \jIuXll as if it were a being among many, at 
the expense of remaining ignorant of its singular presence in life. 
Concurrence as a Non-Tautological Impasse 
In fact, the tendency to treat \jIUXll as a kind of body becomes a central focus of 
Aristotle's account and opens up the first "metaphysical concern" for our discussion, the 
impasse of concurrence. We mentioned that he is interesting in thinking the arche of 
\jIUXll by going through the accounts of previous thinkers. The first book of TIEPI 
'l'YXHL is devoted to this task, exploring these opinions and addressing what is common 
among all of them. 
He says that all of these thinkers claim that while \jIuXll can be understood either 
as a motion, a mode of sense perception, or like embodiment, and that all three can be 
traced back to a more primary source (arche). This commonality is concurrence, because 
all Aristotle's predecessors say that psyche is proper to what it contacts. Concurrence is a 
fundamental aspect for effective teaching, because concurrence helps us understand and 
articulate how contact between souls, teachers and students, is possible. Aristotle 
articulates concurrence as a form of unity and contact between the soul and what it 
knows, but not in the sense of a pure identity. He says, "For they all say like is known by 
like, and since the soul knows all things, they compose it out of all the sources" (OTS, 
405b 17). Here, the statement "like is known by like" is both helpful and deeply 
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misleading. It is helpful because it re-enforces the way 'l'DXll affined with all 
things, it has a prior familiarity with everything, and in the way Socrates discusses 
recollection of psyche. Many times in this inquiry Aristotle shows how thinkers of the 
elemental, the contraries, or other sources, see a self-same identity with 'l'DXll and the 
things it encounters or knowsxiHowever, if we conclude that our discussion has reached a 
terminal point, that we have said all that we need to say, psyche could be articulated as 
any random thing, since it is the things that it perceives. We could find ourselves deeply 
entrenched within the infinite regress of beings that Aristotle previously warned us 
against. 
These methodological warnings intensify and collide when we reach the third 
book and realize that Aristotle thinks that they themselves actually constitute a vital 
concern for our topic, the necessity of error in 'l'DXll. He wants us to program a capacity 
for making mistakes into our account of'l'DXll, which is another fundamental aspect for 
effective teaching. The virtue of humility can involve first philosophy when we 
recognize that we can be unknowingly in a state of error during the course of inquiry. 
The question becomes, how does the admission of being in error help stop the infinite 
regress involved with logos addressed earlier? Aristotle is most clear about this claim 
when he says: 
[Previous thinkers] all assume that thinking is something bodily like 
perceiving, and that perceiving and understanding are of like by like, as 
we described in the chapters at the beginning and they ought to have 
spoken at the same time about making mistakes as well, for this is more 
native to living things and the soul goes on for more time in this condition. 
COTS, 427b) 
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In other words, Aristotle thinks that while previous thinkers thought the phrase "like by 
like" could tautologically ground predications and discussions of how thinking is an 
aspect of \jruX,11, they did not establish a more proper arche for this inquiry. If we simply 
maintain that statement, like is know by like, without inquiry into how it shows impasses 
of first philosophy, our discussion is not allowing us to learn more than we already do. 
"Like by like" is a good starting point for this investigation, because previous thinkers 
have espoused it, but is only an arche if we can supplement it with further inquiry by way 
of speech. By building in a capacity for mistakes into his account of \jruX,11, Aristotle is 
able to account for an impasse in thinking that is often overlooked. If we can agree that 
\jruX,11 can be mistaken, then we can reach for an explanation of human error that does not 
require an account of human failure. Learning that being mistaken can have a 
progressive function enables an account of \jruXll that carefully unfolds on the level of 
first philosophy. 
Impasses Regarding Poein & Paschein 
Aristotle explores how \jruXll might be a kind of motion in order to show why 
concurrence is enigmatic and not tautological. He shows the paradox of attributing the 
phrase "like is known by like" to \jfUXll by articulating impasses involved in speaking of 
\jfUXll as a source of motion. How does \jfuXll move the body? Does this mean that \jfuX,11 
itself is always in motion and thus no logos can be given about it? Is this very 
severability between body and "soul" the very thing that is most deserving of our 
attention? These questions come into focus when Aristotle reminds us that many types of 
motion (kinesis) exist, whether as change of place, alteration, wasting away or growth 
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COTS, 406a 14). This fourfold is articulated due to thinking motion as something that 
may have nothing to do with \\lUX'll, since he previous reminds us "that it is not necessary 
for what moves other things to be in motion itself' COTS, 406a 4). But even if we settle 
on a kind of motion that seems to suit our topic, like the common experience of 
witnessing the growth of a living being, or how the un-educated become educated, he still 
worries that we may not see the central impasse that remains available. He says, 
But surely even ifthe soul itself moves itself, then at any rate it would 
be moved, so that, if every motion is a stepping outside itself of the 
thing moved insofar as it is moved, the soul would step outside its 
own thinghood. COTS, 406b 12) 
This difficult passage shows the struggles philosophy has in discussing how a 
thing can be a source of motion in another without being in motion itself. Not unlike the 
notion of concurrence, this pair is enigmatic and not tautological. Fundamental aspects 
of teaching all involve the application for difficulties and impasses, like this pair 
illustrate. What is strange about \\lUX'll is that it is not independent of the body, such that 
interiority, exteriority and contrariety become deeply misleading terms. Reducing \\lUX'll 
to a motion involves inherent impasses that undermine thinking \\lUX'll as united in its self­
sameness. If we want to say that \\Ium is the ruling origin of motion in the body, then 
nothing else can be behind \\lUX'll as its source. If it is capable of moving itself then it 
would certainly be moving and yet as moved it would be outside of itself, even outside of 
i\ 
its own ground as the thing that it is. 
Thinghood always marks the enduring presence that keeps a being be and this 
logos of locomotion seems to be incompatible with it. In other words, can \\lUX'll stay still 
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as the thing that it is even when it moves? Does this require a different kind ofthinking 
regarding motion as not just something changing its location? Aristotle loves analogies 
and offers one of sailor in a boat to illustrate these confusions regarding motion as the 
ousia of \jIUX'll. 
Aristotle employs the analogy of sailors in a boat many times during this study to 
show what lies beyond the thinking of his predecessors. This occurs most notably when 
he says that, 
And it comes to the same thing with all those who say that the soul 
is what moves itself, for they all assume that motion is the thing that 
is most proper to the soul, this is moved by itself, because they do 
not see anything cause motion that is not also itself in motion. COTS, 404 a 
25) 
The analogy of sailors in a boat is at play in this passage, though it is mentioned 
explicitly earlier in the chapter, due to the fact that the sailors are within something else 
that is moving which incidentally allows them to be in a state ofmovement. We 
understand that the sailors are not moving in the same way that the boat is over the water. 
According to Aristotle, his tradition cannot think of a kind of motion that stays the same, 
something that is a source of movement that is not in movement itself. Aristotle will call 
this kind of sustaining inner movement that makes a thing be what it is, being-at-work­
staying-itself, a guiding term ofhis entire thinking about how \jIUX'll has concurrence with 
the body in a non-tautological way. 
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We have seen that discussions of\jfUXll typically involve giving an account ofhow 
it is an arche. More specifically, \jfUXll is already thought and articulated by the wise to 
be an arche of movement within the body. Aristotle wants to elicit wonder as to how we 
ought to think of this within. The fact that Aristotle wants his students to wonder about 
these difficulties shows how a fundamental aspect of teaching involves bringing students 
towards a respectful encounter with inquiry as a form of wonder. Here, the question is, 
what does it mean for something to be in something else as the being that it is? What is 
that of the student we perceive that endures, as what it is as a certain something, when the 
is student is in the motion called learning? In order to heighten these questions Aristotle 
says the following: 
For all things are moved by a process of pushing and pulling, for 
which reason it is necessary, as in a wheel, for something to stay 
still and for the motion to start from there. (OTS, 433b25) 
In other words, we articulate how a whole being could move according to thinking the 
body as divided in terms of one part that does the moving and one part that suffers the 
action, the ruling origin of movement is not in motion itself. Aristotle sees the structure 
of poein & paschein at work in the logos of \jfUXll even ifwe worry that it may allow 
\jfUXll to step outside of its own thinghood as the thing it is. If the soul is divided in itself 
between a part that suffers and a part that moves, how is it that we can yoke ousia and 
tode ti in the first place? Indeed, he concludes the first book asking us to consider how 
the soul can be a unity. "But then what in the world holds the soul together, ifit is by 
nature divided up? For it is surely not the body, for it seems rather that the soul on the 
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contrary that holds the body together" COTS, 411 b 8). He thinks that the body cannot 
hold \jrUXll together because we typically address a moving body when we perceive a 
living creature. Yet if we treat the soul as the unmoved mover, then how can it be an 
arche of movement in the body? 
In order to unite these different perplexities together we should advance upon the 
second and final concern proper to this essay, especially since it has been in play 
throughout our discussion. Aristotle investigates the question as to how \jrUXll can have a 
share in motion in its own right by looking toward a way to ground the notion of 
concurrence in the most primary kind of inward activity belonging to living beings, 
aisthesis. Sachs discusses aisthesis as sense perception by saying that it is "always the 
reception of organized wholes never just sensation or isolated sense data" COTS, 199). In 
other words, sense-perception always involves the active receiving of how a tode ti shows 
its way towards wholeness as the thing that it is. This is an example of how first 
philosophy involves an articulation ofhow the singular and the whole to which it belongs 
hang together. Let us explore how this account of sense-perception deepens our previous 
difficulties. 
Aristotle intensifies the account of \jfUXTl by unfolding a notion of sense­
perception that is common to all life, on his view, even plants have this potency of \jfUXll 
COTS, 434a 30). What is interesting for our purposes is how he explains why aisthesis is 
not to be understood in terms of a motion, but rather as a form of being-at-work. This is 
of absolute importance, because ifAristotle can show that the most common activity of 
\jfUXll is not a motion, then perhaps he can reach a way through the impasses involved in 
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speaking of \(lUX'll as the arche of motion in the body involving pushing and pulling. 
Being-at-work is Sachs' careful translation of energeia, (Ev8P'Y8tU). "The primary sense 
of the word belongs to activities that are not motions; examples of these are seeing, 
knowing, and happiness, each understood as an ongoing state that is complete at every 
instant" (OTS, 189). Sachs often compares being-at-work to an orbit, the way the object 
moving from point to point in a closed path does not fully reveal how it is actively 
staying still as the thing that it is. 
Sense-perception is a being-at-work and is unfolded in speech the impasse of 
concurrence and grounds the immediacy, richness, and union of sense and sensed, doing 
and suffering. The commonality of thinking "like is known by like" breaks down when 
Aristotle says that while" the being-at-work of the perceptible thing and of the sense that 
perceives it are one and the same, though the being of them is not the same" (OTS, 425 b 
26). 
This formulation is better than a simple tautology, because perceptions are exactly what 
they are when they are fully present in our active lives when we are perceptive. This 
open quality to Aristotle's account of what involves perception is a fundamental aspect 
for effective teaching, because teachers need to get access to the student as a receptive 
whole. 
Another aspect of Aristotle's formulation of sense-perception involves the 
impasse of truth, and how the sense and the things sensed are akin. He says that they are 
always true in a very precise sense, "for sense perception when directed at its proper 
objects is always truthful, and is present in all animals, but it is not possible to think 
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things through falsely, and this is present in no animal in which there is not also speech" 
(OTS, 427 b 12). In other words aisthesis is able to ground the way sensing and sensed 
affine in a way that does not establish a rigorous relation of identity between them. We 
would be seriously misled if we articulated Aristotle as proto correspondence theorist of 
truth or understanding truth as a form of correctness. In other words, the way sight 
always sees and hearing always hears demonstrates concurrence as an aspect of'lrUXTJ that 
is exactly what it is when it is involved in acts of sense-perception. Teachers need to 
know this account of sense-perception so that they can know about the student as a whole 
and yet still have the possibility of making mistakes regarding student assessment. 
A philosophical inquiry into 'IrUXTJ by way of speech should recognize certain 
modes of disclosure, which are the foundations of assuming the starting points for inquiry 
at all. The way that logos seems to open up an infinite regress that must be grounded in 
ousia is a fundamental aspect for effective teaching, because teachers need to know how 
to limit their accounts of knowledge. Aristotle thinks philosophers should inquire into 
psyche by tracing all of its origins, potencies, forms of being-at-work, attributes, and 
incidental relationships towards the wealthxii of ousia, which serves as both the grounding 
of the possibility for predication and the maintenance of the horizontal categorizationxiii 
of being. Aristotle wants this attunement with ousia to help the inquiry of psyche, since 
asking about "the soul" can have to do both with its thinghood or "whatness" as well as 
how it is already present as the life we see all around us, as singularly perceived living 
bodies. 
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Aristotle is able to find the assumptions behind his predecessors' accounts of 
psyche by interrogating their claims and finding that they all agree that psyche is either 
the origin of motion in the body or the modes of thinking and discernment, like sense­
perception. However, claims such as these all must assume that "like is known by like" 
and Aristotle extracts and surpasses this phrase from their accounts. For the purposes of 
articulating philosophy of education that is worthwhile to teachers, this point about the 
dialogical structure of knowledge is important, because teachers need proper access into 
education as a tradition. This is a fundamental aspect for effective teaching. 
Furthermore, Aristotle shows the tendency of treating \lfUX,11 as a kind of body, a 
this, a ready made whole that stands out from the background that surrounds it. Yet, this 
certain something of \lfUXYJ is only available in life; "soul" is what it is only insofar as it is 
en-souled. Aristotle is able to expose the impasses of previous thinkers which were all 
grounded in more fundamental and more difficult impasses, one of which is the thought 
of radical interiority, a "within" that must be possible for thinking the soul's place in the 
body. In other words, Aristotle's account of\lfuX,11 transforms both materialist and overly 
ephemeral notions of "soul" into how all life is affined and internally active as modes of 
being-at-work. 
In other words, a well-articulated account of."the soul" is an essential component 
of human self-experience and therefore can function as a fundamental aspect of effective 
teaching. In general, our experience holds the capacity for growth in the way \lfUX,11 
undergoes its own inwards revolutions as being-at-work. For Aristotle, being-at-work 
names how we stay the same throughout educative change and can experience kinship 
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with others who are in their own process of learning. This concurrence between 
"souls" is something we share in and a proper inquiry into our shared experience allows 
us to recognize that the varieties of all life forms are similar, as living and enduring 
throughout change. 
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CHAPTER III
 
SOCRATIC PERSUASION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC
 
When people articulate opinions of great concern they reveal their character 
through dialogue. Yet, sometimes a person rigidifies their relationship towards their 
opinions in a way that prevents them from engaging in speech with others in a manner 
conducive to the improvement of their character. They may hold towards reached 
conclusions too tightly at the cost of conversation or simply abandon their trust in speech 
altogether if their opinions are shown to contain contradictions. On the other hand, some 
seek personal advantage by exploiting certain rhetorical aspects of speech in order to 
manipulate and control others, because they believe that speech is power. In a community 
involving this degradation of human self-development, where could we find friends who 
would mutually desire to be persuaded towards a life ofjustice? Can we expect that even 
those who lack a debased relation to speech would receive an adequate presentation of 
justice on the basis of human conduct in the right way? Indeed, within Platonic dialogue, 
Socrates encounters these characterizations and questions in Book 1 of the Republic and 
spends the remainder of that dialogue trying to persuade others of their importance. 
Fundamentally, this essay seeks to provide an inter-textual reading of the cave 
image, articulated in the seventh book of the Republic, so that we can understand its 
content with respect for its proper context. The different models of education described 
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by Socrates in the Cave, putting knowledge in the soul vs. turning the soul around, cannot 
be understood without recognizing their relation to the rest of the dialogue as a whole, 
especially to how various characters configure justice. In other words, I will not discuss 
the famous "Platonic account of education" as it relates to the human "soul" and its self­
knowledge, until we understand how our character shows itself in dialogue. I will refer 
to our relation to dialogue as a way to talk about how we find ourselves at stake in 
Platonic dialogue by following Socrates i . Our capacity for educational growth is directly, 
but not primarily, related to speech in dialogue with others. Our character that forms and 
is formed by us holds the potency for self-transformation most powerfully in dialogue 
with others and even ourselves. Discussing our "relation to speech" is a great way to 
indicate the paradox that we become who we are. Our character is revealed in how we 
relate to matters of dialogue, especially if following speech leads to both abandoning and 
fulfilling our deepest opinions and assumptions about ourselves through inquiry. The 
two educational "models," which Socrates contrasts by articulating the Cave image, each 
involve different ways of understanding the human and its community, especially in 
terms of how Socrates articulates the relation between persuasive speech and the life of 
justice. 
These two educational models will be compared by investigating how the 
question ofjustice becomes transformed, as it is re-articulated by several characters in the 
Republic. We will open this discussion by tracking how justice is framed and defended 
in various ways as the first book of the Republic transitions towards the second. 
Specifically, by understanding why Polemarchus offers an interpretation of the poetry of 
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Simonides' only to later abandon its consequences, we will be able to see that thinking 
justice is intimately connected to myth and its tradition. We will attempt to make the 
same conclusion by marking how Thrasymachus transforms Polemarchus' account of the 
just into what is set down towards the advantage of the ruler and how, as lord and master, 
this one relates to a life of injustice toward the ruled. Finally we will see how Glaucon's 
desire for a "truly persuasive" Socratic account of the just life involves another shift in 
the discussion, from what the just is, to how justice is articulated alongside the good and 
lived life ofjustice. 
In all three of these moments I attempt to not only show how the logos of the just 
becomes re-articulated, but also that the corresponding Socratic refutations of them are 
not negative. On the contrary, they are ways of intensifying and sustaining the question 
ofjustice in a way that demonstrates how Socrates is a profoundly powerful educator. As 
a manifestation of his character, we see Socrates' relation to following the logos as a 
fundamental aspect for effective teaching. He is an educator due to how he embodies 
wonder, the most important philosophic term for education. We will see that as an 
educator in this dialogue, Socrates encounters characters that are unwilling to partake in 
the learning process while others share the Socratic desire involving the assent towards 
the ascent out of the Cave. 
The thesis of this investigation is that the Cave image does not only offer two 
different accounts of human nature in its desire for education, but it is an image that 
ultimately involves the question ofjustice. Justice names the condition for the very 
possibility of improving ones character, which is a fundamental way to think of 
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education. Justice is articulated in a way that is directly indicative of the character of the 
one espousing it. Insofar as these characters show who they are by articulating justice in 
the manner that they do, they indicate whether or not they are capable of learning or have 
a desire to become more learned than they are. 
Polemarchus' Disloyal Loyalty 
In the first book of the Republic, as Socrates begins his ascent towards Athens 
from the festival in Piraeus, he encounters a group of playful thugs spoken for by 
Polemarchus, who makes the following claim: "Either prove stronger than these men or 
stay here" (REP, 327 C)ii. To which Socrates responds, "Isn't there another possibility, 
our persuading you that you must let us go". To this other alternative, Polemarchus 
responds rather strangely, "Could you really persuade if we don't listen?" (REP, 327 C). 
In this first exchange of dialogue we should make the following conclusions about the 
characters, Socrates and Polemarchus. Polemarchus frames his relation to the logos in 
terms of strength, especially the strength one feels from being in a large group. He 
implicitly asserts that strength in numbers outweighs the strength of anyone individual 
by speaking on behalf of the gang. By initially stating that being arrested is the only 
alternative to becoming stronger than the group, Polemarchus shows how strength 
determines his relation to speech. 
More importantly for our discussion, Polemarchus does not see strength to be a 
component of words or arguments, since he counters Socrates' alternative involving 
persuasion with a claim about force. The force to ignore is a refusal to listen in a certain 
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way, and is a typical student reaction to problems posed in dialogue. This most primarily 
marks how we are to understand Polemarchus as a polemic. Polemarchus' name means 
warlord and so far his words match this characterization. He wishes to force Socrates to 
remain in Piraeus by refusing to listen and thus seeming to remain immune to the 
transformative character of persuasion in speech. His question dislodges the power of 
persuasion only insofar as he steadfastly refuses to listen. Given the content of the 
question, it seems impossible that the questioner would not listen to any words elicited by 
the question. In other words, how can his question be asked as a genuine question, as 
something that demands a response? 
It is worth noting that it is Glaucon who agrees to stay and accompany the group 
to Cephalus' house, where the rest of the Republic will unfold. We will return to the way 
in which Glaucon is a character who mirrors the Socratic desire for persuasive logoi later. 
After talking to Cephalus about how he is dealing with "the threshold of old age", 
Socrates addresses Polemarchus by saying, ''''Tell me you, the heir of the argument, what 
was it Simonides said about justice that you assert he said correctly?" (REP, 331 e). To 
which Polemarchus answers, on behalf of the poet Simonides, "That it is to give to each 
what is owed" (REP, 331 e). Here, Socrates frames his question to Polemarchus in an 
interesting way, since he affirms Polemarchus as an heir. He recognizes Polemarchus as 
an inheritor, not only as an expectant son of a grand inheritance, but by doing so also 
already anticipates the way in which Polemarchus will articulate justice. Indeed, 
Socrates' judge of character is verified as soon as Polemarchus speaks. He reveals that 
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he understands education to be primarily about inheriting citations from the wise by the 
fact that he quickly spouts off a memorized saying of a famous poet. 
Socrates inhabits a strange place in this conversation by assuming that Simonides 
was wise, while at the same time professing ignorance about the content of his logos 
regarding justice. "He is a wise and divine man. However, you, Polemarchus, perhaps 
know what on earth he means, but I don't understand" (REP, 331 e). This statement is an 
example of a Socratic double gesture. While Socrates asserts that Simonides' saying 
could be incoherent, somehow it still maintains his wise reputation. The readiness by 
which Socrates employs a counter example, saying that it would be unjust to return a 
weapon if the owner demands it back to commit a crime, suggests that Simonides' logos 
is in need of supplement and is an enactment of how justice is configured as what is owed 
(REP, 332 a). It is strange to think of how one would go about supplementing the wise 
and how our relation to "common sense" is involved in such a project. Socrates 
concludes by suggesting that Simonides "made a riddle, after the fashion of poets, when 
he said what the just is" (REP, 332 b). In other words, Socrates deepens Simonides' 
phrase by allowing its content to admit of a strangeness that is proper to it. For Socrates, 
enigma as such belongs to our most common opinions and assumptions. By claiming 
that the saying is a riddle, Socrates shows that all wisdom involves impasse (aporia). 
Polemarchus will show that he cannot think of a riddle as a riddle. Doing so would mean 
that something about the enigmatic quality of the riddle might be worth lingering upon 
instead of simply abandoning its difficulty. This is a component of effective teaching, 
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because educators should comport themselves towards enigmas and impasses with 
humility and seriousness. 
Polemarchus revises his account ofjustice, by way of a qualification, in order to 
negate any positive power that the enigmatic aspects of Simonides' logos may entail. 
Justice becomes giving harm to enemies and loyalty to friends (REP, 332 d). However, 
this revision responds to Socrates' question regarding how justice can be thought of as a 
kind of art (techne) of dispensation, and does not address whether or not justice is like an 
art at all when he says that harm to enemies and loyalty to friends function as apportions. 
His revision dodges Socrates' initial question, yet we are not sure if Polemarchus intends 
to simply evade the question because he does not have an answer or if he is completely 
unaware of the question itself. Socrates has not asked whether or not art is an appropriate 
way to discuss what justice is, he simply asks which art is concerned with "giving what to 
which things" (REP, 332 d). This distinction becomes absolutely crucial for Socrates' 
refutation of Polemarchus' account, as we will soon discover. 
Socrates continues to dialogue with Polemarchus about justice in terms of the 
usefulness ofjustice during times of conflict and its seemingly uselessness in times of 
peace iii . When Polemarchus answers that justice is useful in peacetime for conditioning 
contracts and partnerships, Socrates asks "Then, when gold or silver must be used in 
partnerships, in what case is the just man more useful than the others?" (REP, 333 c). 
Polemarchus thinks he can easily answer this question by saying "When they must be 
deposited and kept safe Socrates" (REP, 333 c). Polemarchus does not question whether 
or not the language of utility is proper to discussing justice and further reveals his 
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inability to question craft (techne). He sees that the just person is only useful in financial 
dealings by acting as a kind of safety deposit box. The just person is safe and steadfast, 
compared to the unjust person, who might be unable to restrain themselves from a 
collection of funds, but still inactive and seemingly inept in the establishment of social 
contract. Polemarchus' unwillingness to worry about speaking ofjustice in terms of the 
distinction between usefulness & uselessness allows Socrates to continue to follow out 
the trajectory of this line of reasoning by saying: "And with respect to everything else as 
well, is justice useless in the use of each and useful in its uselessness?" Upon 
Polemarchus' reluctant agreement to this question Socrates concludes "Then justice, my 
friend, wouldn't be anything very serious, if it is useful for useless things" (REP, 333 e). 
In other words, Socrates assumes from the onset that giving an account ofjustice 
is not only important, but by default, among the most serious of matters. He has already 
shown that this task involves persuasion. Here he tests his dialogue partner with the 
language of techne because he knows that it may unsettle the grave concern involved in 
speaking ofjustice well. Socrates worries how justice is already in play, forming the 
contracts and partnerships between people, yet also stands by idle in order for these 
contracts to be safely insured. Socrates connects this impasse about justice as use to the 
previous conversation about the wise in order to dislodge how Polemarchus thinks of 
himself as educated. 
Socrates does not hesitate to allow the conclusions from a given argument unsettle 
the premises of that argument. Socrates wants to trace how justice cannot be collapsed 
into a discussion about wealth and utility, nor can an account ofjustice be taken from the 
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wise and understood without violating their authority. The following exchange between 
Socrates and Polemarchus demonstrates this point: 
Justice, then, seems, according to you & Homer & Simonides, to 
be a certain art of stealing, for the benefit to be sure, of friends & 
the harm of others. Isn't that what you meant? 
No, by Zeus, he said. But I no longer know what I did mean. 
However, it is still my opinion that justice is helping friends and 
harming enemies. (REP 334 b) 
It is interesting that Socrates groups Polemarchus with the wise poets. By doing so he 
plays to Polemarchus' pride, because of how Polemarchus' previous understanding of 
learning is reliant upon the unproblematic memorization and reiteration of authoritative 
sayings. In this conclusion, Socrates combines the impasse of thinking justice as a 
beneficial art with the claim that justice is distributive. Yet, Socrates says that if justice 
were like an art then it would be most like stealing, since the just person would be 
configured in at least two ways. The clever guard, over money that is not being put to use 
in partnership, is a just person as a guarantee for the possibility of partnership, but also 
agreed to be the most apt thief of the money by being the most proximate to it. 
If we agree that the best guard could make the best thief, then we are forced to 
consider that the just person does not inhabit a single function in human community. The 
power of an artist lies in the correspondence between their arts in regards to its product. 
Every art has a particular end that is appropriate to it as the activity that it is. Yet, even as 
an art of safekeeping contracts, justice is not an art. It does not seem to have a single 
product or even be understood as a kind of single activity. In the example above, 
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Polemarchus' speech about justice as the giving of what is owed cannot be maintained, 
because the just person cannot withhold or lack anything on account of being just. It is 
revealed through speech that justice is not configured by anyone activity or function in 
relation to a single product. Justice does not seem to produce anything, but is still 
assumed to be "most serious". 
Socrates makes two claims that finally conclude everything that has been said 
about justice in his dialogue with Polemarchus. First, he focuses on the role of trust in 
articulating justice as a kind of dispensation. While questioning Polemarchus' assertion 
that justice is the portion we give to friends and enemies, Socrates asks if it is possible to 
make mistakes between those who merely seem just and who truly are (REP, 334 c). 
Polemarchus agrees, but does not seem to let this question affect his opinion, which may 
have allowed him to think of himselfas mistaken. Justice involves a prior kind of 
relationship to our opinions about who we think our friends and enemies are which does 
not seem to be fully understood by Polemarchus. In other words, justice enables the 
conditions for the possibility of dialogic interaction, even when we may be unaware of 
what has been dispensed. 
Later in this conversation Socrates sums up by claiming, "Then, according to your 
argument, it's just to treat badly men who have done nothing unjust?"(REP, 334 d). In 
other words, if we mistake who seems and is just, the act of treating others by giving 
them what is owed can fail to correspond to a clean distinction between friends and 
enemies. Polemarchus' response is a refusal to agree to this claim and shows most 
potently why he does not have a relationship to speech conducive of learning. He says, 
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"Not at all Socrates, for the argument seems to be bad" (REP, 334 d). To Polemarchus, if 
problematic conclusions follow from a given claim, then the claim is simply false. In this 
specific case, while Polemarchus admits that the argument has been shown to be bad, he 
is not willing to adjust his opinions according to what his dialogue with Socrates has 
revealed to him. He has shown by virtue of his words that he cannot learn. 
With this evidence in hand, Socrates continues to investigate the claim made by 
Simonides on behalf of Polemarchus. Socrates does so by asking, "Isn't justice human 
virtue?" (REP, 335 c). Upon Polemarchus' swift agreement to the equivalence of the 
terms in this question, Socrates is able to conclude "Then my friend, human beings who 
have been harmed necessarily become more unjust" (REP, 335 c). In other words, if 
justice was virtue, in the sense ofhuman character, then justice would allow us to account 
for how human beings become who they are. People are either more or less just as a 
result of being helped or hindered in various ways by the community of friends and 
enemies. 
However, Socrates goes one step further, by way of conclusion, before having his 
conversation with Polemarchus violently interrupted. His account connects everything 
said thus far about justice back to the wisdom of Simonides, by saying: 
Then if someone asserts that it's just to give what is owed to each man-and 
he understands by this that harm is owed to enemies by the just man and 
help to friends-the man who said it was not wise. For he wasn't telling the 
truth. For it has become apparent to us that it is never just to harm anyone. 
(REP 335 e) 
In other words, the wise necessarily speak on behalf of truth, which has a negative 
relation to harm. They would not maintain an account of justice as a kind of 
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apportionment, since it would not preclude the harming of others, which is held as a 
prerequisite of being just. Upon Polemarchus' agreement to these claims, Socrates shows 
that the just person, in general, must withhold as much, if not more, than they dispense. 
Simply accounting for justice in terms of what is owed is shown to be problematic. 
Furthermore, we see that justice is discussed alongside deep affinities with human 
character. Through dialogue we are shown that the distinction between our enemies and 
friends are is not superficial and cannot exhaust what justice is, in terms ofhow our 
character is co-determined by how others relate to us in speech. 
Polemarchus articulates justice in a way that prevents him from thinking deeper 
about community relations. How do we know who are friends and enemies are 
beforehand, such that we can dispense with what is owed to each? Polemarchus thinks of 
Socrates as a kind of friend, but only in terms ofhis loyalty to Socrates in conflict. Since 
this loyalty unfolds within a context ofdialogic conflict, it is not a loyalty that will 
sustain healthy inquiry into justice. Indeed, Socrates assumes that Polemarchus will 
return to his primary articulation of friendship as blind loyalty in terms of strife and 
battle. By maintaining the wisdom ofthe wise, Socrates would view Polemarchus as an 
ally in battle against those who would attribute paradox to the poets. He is a polemic 
who engages in polemic speech when he agrees to do battle with Socrates (REP, 336 a). 
Polemarchus is shown to be unreceptive to dialogue in a certain way that prevents him 
from investigating what justice is in a way conducive to learning. Being able to decipher 
whether a student is prevented from improving their character on the basis ofwhat they 
think they know is another important aspect of effective teaching. It is unclear if Socrates 
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still thinks he can persuade Polemarchus and if persuasion is a viable alternative to a 
show of strength. The notion of conflict as it relates to human dialogue anticipates 
Thrasymachus' interruption of the conversation, since it is Thrasymachus whose 
character is most violent and rhetorically combative. 
Thrasymachus' Sophistical Relation to Speech 
Socrates discovers that Thrasymachus has a more sophisticated relationship to 
speech and justice than Polemarchus when Thrasymachus decides to interrupt the 
discussion between Polemarchus and Socrates regarding justice. He is described as 
"hunched up like wild beast", before he exclaims, ""If you truly want to know what the 
just is, don't only ask and gratify your love of honor by refuting whatever someone 
answers, you know that it is easier to ask than to answer" (REP, 336 e). Here, 
Thrasymachus not only illustrates his impatience with how the dialogue about justice has 
occurred so far, but also reveals his character, insofar as it shows itself in what he says. 
For Thrasymachus, speech should make its way towards clear and precise answers 
without the relentless questioning of interlocutors. This sophistical relation to speech is 
directly indicative of Thrasymachus' ethical character as one who wishes to rule in 
dialogue with brute strength in a way that limits the excessive movement of logos. 
Socrates expresses fear in regards to this account of Thrasymachus' and his 
beastlike appearance. Necessarily, he also displays courageiv in terms of a steadfast 
pursuit of speaking about justice in the face of the wild danger that Thrasymachus 
embodies. While he offers an apology about his unwillingness to make mistakes in 
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regards to the dialogue about justice, he still claims that justice is most serious and "a 
thing more precious than a great deal of gold" (REP 336 e). Here, Socrates reminds us 
that we are all at stake in accomplishing the agreement that justice is the most serious of 
inquiries, and should be considered for its own sake. In this way, Socrates shows that a 
proper seriousness towards difficulties shown in the logos is an important aspect of 
effective teaching. He echoes how Polemarchus articulates justice as a kind of craft, 
which is only useful for useless things. If we thought that giving a true account ofjustice 
would be likened to finding great deal of riches, we would not understand why Socrates 
thinks the dialogic inquiry ofjustice is most serious. Socrates avoids purposely making 
mistakes which may add more obscurity to the inquiry ofjustice than is needed. 
After hearing this Socratic apology, Thrasymachus laughs scornfully and says, 
"Heracles! Here is that habitual irony of Socrates. I knew it, and I predicted to these 
fellows that you wouldn't be willing to answer, that you would be ironic and do anything 
rather than answer if someone asked you something" (REP 337a). In other words, 
Thrasymachus offers both a criticism and a confession by virtue of his speech. His 
criticism lies in his distrust for Socrates as a just dialogue partner. He also displays 
distrust towards any notion of dialogical progress and shows that he cannot learn in 
dialogue by virtue ofhis focus on fulfilling predictions. For Thrasymachus, irony is 
merely a pretended ignorance in discussion, which, for Socrates, is habitual and therefore 
unavoidable on the basis of his character. On the other hand, he confesses previous 
assumptions about how Socrates would conduct himself in conversation, assumptions 
which he openly predicted to the others before this discussion with Polemarchus began. 
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It is Thrasymachus that sets down claims about Socrates' character and how that 
character is directly revealed through a relation to the logos. 
Socrates is not unaware of how he appears to Thrasymachus, therefore he 
responds enigmatically for a purpose. He responds to these claims about irony in a way 
that offers a defense of his character, precisely as ironic\ by saying, "That's because you 
are wise, Thrasymachus" (REP 337 a). By referring to Thrasymachus as a wise person, 
Socrates seeks to pacify his beastlike appearance, by simply embellishing his pride. 
Socrates also makes this compliment explicit to reiterate the discussion on the logos of 
the wise that has already transpired with Polemarchus. Socrates continues to inquire how 
predictions could work in human dialogue to prevent learning, as persuasive speech, by 
saymg: 
Hence you knew quite well that if you asked someone how much twelve is 
and in asking told him beforehand, 'See to it you don't tell me, you human 
being, that it is two times six, or three times four, or six times two, or four 
times three; I won't accept such nonsense from you' -it was plain to you, I 
suppose, that one would answer a man who asks in this way (REP 337 b). 
Here, Socrates further explores what it means to control the momentum of a dialogue that 
seeks inquiry. He offers a contrast between Thrasymachus' predictions about his own 
ironic engagements in speech, and a situation where someone is prevented to answer, in a 
certain way, the question about how much twelve is. By commanding beforehand that 
one is not to say what twelve is in terms of its multiples, the interlocutor is prevented 
from dealing with their confusion regarding how any single number can be articulated in 
a manifold manner. Thrasymachus seems wise to Socrates because he at least knows that 
reckoning a single number may involve a gathering together of many. We should recall 
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that this discussion has been framed by accounting for justice in terms of what Simonides 
says. It is unclear why Socrates does not blame him more forcefully that this logos is 
used un-justly, because something remains withheld, since, by doing so he could redeem 
Simonides' status as wise while not simply returning to his logos in a superficial way. 
Socrates seeks to investigate, in friendly dialogue, what Thrasymachus could 
possibly say about the contrast between this situation involving counting and his own 
dialogical practice, which has been charged as ironic. Interestingly, Thrasymachus does 
not give an answer, but simply cedes by saying: "as if this case were similar to the other" 
(REP 337 c). In other words, Thrasymachus is unwilling to offer a translation between 
these two situations, even though he seems to have familiarity with each case in order to 
discover the differences between them. His unwillingness to see an analogy here is 
demonstrative of his inability to see himself at stake in the account of the logos that he 
has given. This unwillingness demonstrates how Thrasymachus has self-imposed limits 
to the improvement of his character. 
Socrates thinks that analogy is a powerful way to think of irony. In this case, 
Thrasymachus thinks that his earlier prediction about Socrates has nothing to do with 
someone forbidding another to answer a question in a certain way. Thrasymachus thinks 
that predictions, especially ones that we are forbidden to access before engaging in 
dialogue, do not affect the dialogue or its partners. Socrates will assert that Thrasymachus 
is someone worthy of learning from, given the fact that he seems to know what justice is 
and is unwilling to pursue the logos of the just given by Polemarchus. He sees himself as 
a strong ruler that will "set down" a more praiseworthy account. However, Socrates 
48 
could be further articulating irony, when he claims that we have finally found a character 
worth learning about justice from, because Thrasymachus' un-receptive attitude toward 
how logos can encourage improvement prevents him from being an effective teacher. 
Socrates subtly defends himself against Thrasymachus' claim that it is easier to 
ask questions rather than answer, in a manner which preserves his status as a true and just 
educator. He says that he "deserves to suffer," or learn, from one who knows (REP 337 
d). He says this because he, upon consideration, takes the responsibility of answering 
what Thrasymachus has forbidden. By doing so, Socrates shows an important aspect of 
teaching, by showing why teachers should take risks in dialogue. In this case, he admits 
that it is appropriate for someone who does not know to suffer and learn from someone 
with knowledge and admit of their own ignorance regarding justice. However, 
Thrasymachus is not satisfied that simply "suffering" the learning from the teacher is an 
adequate way to demonstrate submission to the authority of the teacher. He demonstrates 
this by claiming, "But in addition to learning, pay a fine in money too" (REP 337 d). In 
other words, Thrasymachus articulates learning alongside monetary transactions and 
payments that are substantial. He shows a relation towards teaching and learning that 
echoes the discussion ofjustice as a form of craft, and how as a craft, justice concerns 
itself with money. 
At this point in the dialogue, Socrates has been ordered to pay a monetary fine in 
order to receive teachings from Thrasymachus regarding what justice truly is. When 
Socrates admits that this learning will have to take place in the future, when he obtains 
the wealth necessary to pay the fine, the dialogue seems to have become terminated. 
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Since, ifhe cannot pay, Thrasymachus will simply not engage in dialogue. Yet, Glaucon 
comes to Socrates' aid by the contribution of funds, with help from all the others in the 
conversation, for Thrasymachus to discuss justice in a way that demonstrates his learned 
knowledge on the matter (REP 337 d). 
Thrasymachus says that he is not surprised that Socrates' friends offer financial 
aid for the discussion ofjustice to continue and does not want to fulfill the habit of 
Socratic irony by occupying the questioner in the dialogue. He wants to answer, in a way 
that sets down a logos that asserts his strength, without need for the process of 
questioning. Socrates refuses to answer about justice, since he maintains ignorance as to 
what it is, and commands Thrasymachus to gratify all by answering about what justice 
truly is (REP 338 a). Upon conceding to partake in this task, Thrasymachus says, "Here 
is the wisdom of Socrates; unwilling himself to teach, he goes around learning from 
others, and does not even give thanks to them" (REP 338 b). Here, Thrasymachus further 
develops his sophistical relation to the logos, since he thinks praise, in the form of 
gratitude, constitutes the student's relation to the teacher. According to Thrasymachus, 
teaching occurs on the basis of knowledge that is, without question, certain of being 
transmitted to students by teachers. He thinks that Socrates' wisdom is a mere disguise, 
because it enables the gathering of knowledge without payment, in the form of fines or by 
suffering the process of learning dictated by the learned. On this account, Socrates is a 
cheater and wise only in the sense of avoiding payment for discursive knowledge. 
However, Thrasymachus does have an account of justice, and now that the 
payment for dispensing it has been secured, it can be unfolded. Upon his first articulation 
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of what justice truly is, he says, "Now listen, I say that the just is nothing other than the 
advantage of the stronger. Well, why don't you praise me? But you won't be willing" 
(REP 338 c). Again, we see the circularity involved in improving our character through 
dialogue, since how one speaks about justice cannot be divorced from the claims one 
makes about justice. Thrasymachus has already shown himself to have a violent 
relationship to speech based on strength, both physical and rhetorical. His anger and 
impatience are clearly shown in his words, which will prove incompatible with a teacher 
involved with justice. 
Upon setting this definition ofjustice down, Thrasymachus thinks that his job, as 
a ruler of this conversation, is completed insofar as his definition seems self-sufficient 
upon the authority of his strength. Justice does not seem to be given a comprehensive 
definitive account, since it is simply the self-assertion of the stronger. Yet, 
Thrasymachus would disagree, by arguing that justice has been given a definite meaning, 
in that is it embodied in the strength of the ruler and set down as law in a way that 
benefits their direct advantage. Justice is only involved in Thrasymachus' logos by virtue 
of its articulation by the ruler, who is just by default and self-declaration. 
Socrates responds to this account ofjustice by saying that he must first learn what 
this definition ofjustice could mean or entail (REP 338 c). Here, he shows further 
evidence as to why he previously claimed Thrasymachus was wise. In making a claim 
about wisdom, Socrates thinks Thrasymachus' speech is in need of supplementation or, at 
least, re-iteration, because the sayings of the wise are never divorced from the dialogic 
aspects of philosophizing. This conversational unfolding of wisdom occurs despite 
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dialogue which may demonstrate that wise sayings are never un-problematic. In this 
way, Socrates questions how this traditional aspect of logos is to be interpreted, and 
careful interpretation of prior knowledge is a fundamental aspect for effective teaching. 
To Thrasymachus justice as the advantage of the strong regardless of what our 
predecessors have said, while Socrates disagrees with the idea that arguments can be set 
down about justice without need for elaboration in discussion. 
Later, Socrates elevates an aspect of what Thrasymachus says about justice by. 
admitting that justice has something to do with advantage, particularly in regards to the 
advantage ofjust laws for any ruling group. Yet, he remains perplexed and wonders 
about what it is to be the stronger. While he will argue that justice is connected to our 
advantage, he does so in order to remind us that he and Polemarchus already granted and 
demanded that justice be the most serious kind of dialogic inquiry (REP 333 e). But this 
concern presents itself as a kind of humility in the face of the daunting challenges 
presented in the dialogue about justice. The Socratic response to the threats of 
Thrasymachus' logos may seem tame or ineffective, but they are appropriate reactions to 
Thrasymachus' character. 
Socrates furthers Thrasymachus' account ofjustice by persuading Thrasymachus 
that the rulers of the city, as the strong, are still capable of making mistakes, even when 
they set down laws to govern the city in ajust manner (REP 339 c). Yet, Thrasymachus 
does not want this argument to upset the authority of the ruler, insofar as the ruler is the 
most strong by asserting their strength by setting down laws in an unmistaken way. He 
says that in regard to precise speech, the just ruler is like a craftsman and therefore is 
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incapable of making mistakes when they rule. "So no craftsman, wise man, or ruler 
makes mistakes at the moment when he is ruling" (REP 340 e). Thrasymachus, like 
Polemarchus, does not question the language of craft in discussing justice. He differs 
from Polemarchus though, because he is the one who makes this assertion, while it is 
Socrates who links justice to craft in the conversation with Polemarchus. Thrasymachus 
recognizes the connection between justice and craft, since his argument regarding the 
stronger is reliant upon the art of ruling as what produces justice. 
Socrates is interested in how the ruler is allied with justice itself, not simply 
productive ofjustice in the city externally. In order to show how justice is productive of 
just people, I must remark about how Socrates will offer a refutation of Thrasymachus' 
account ofjustice in a way that shifts the discussion ofjustice as an external "setting 
down" on behalf of the strong to an internal relation in a single individual. I will do this 
in order to show why Thrasymachus has mistaken himself as ajust educator, and how his 
account ofjustice prevents him from being persuaded to this fact. Socrates' argument to 
show how justice cannot solely be the advantage of the stronger occurs as he critiques the 
homogeneous account of human community that Thrasymachus' account ofjustice 
presupposes. By declaring justice as the advantage the stronger, Thrasymachus 
establishes at least two different communities, the strong and the weak, where the later 
does not benefit from the justice in terms of advantage. 
Socrates puts this account into relief by claiming that even thieves have a kind of 
honor that keeps them bound to the community in which they belong (REP 351 c). He 
asserts this more fully by asking the following question: 
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Do you believe that either a city, or an army, or pirates, or robbers, or any 
other tribe which has some cornmon unjust enterprise would be able to 
accomplish anything, if its members acted unjustly to one another? (REP 
351 c) 
When Thrasymachus agrees that justice must condition how such groups function, his 
account ofjustice as the advantage of the stronger must transform. This transformation is 
necessitated, because a unified honor among thieves shows justice in a way that is 
mutually beneficial to all members of the group, not just those who are most strong. In 
other words, justice occurs to unify members of a group in a way that is friendly and 
mutually conducive for each member's advantage and the advantage of the whole, not 
merely the advantage of the ruling member of such a group. 
Socrates does not allow this claim to support solipsism or a debased kind of gang 
mentality, because he articulates justice as fulfilling friendship within individuals as well 
as among communities. He says that even the ruler must not allow injustice to corne into 
being within himself, because "it will make him unable to act, because he is at faction 
and not at mind with himself' (REP 352 a). In other words, Socrates shows 
Thrasymachus, by virtue of a inquiry into justice by way of the logos, that his account of 
justice as the advantage of the stronger must be mistaken. No ruler could seek their own 
advantage without being internally constituted with coherence and integrity, which shows 
that justice must always already be present in a certain way before the ruler sets down 
any account of what justice entails. Thrasymachus cannot maintain his self-
understanding as any kind of teacher ifhe dogmatically adheres to his considered 
advantage. 
54 
The conflict between Socrates and Thrasymachus does not simply illustrate two 
opposing arguments regarding justice, but shows different ways of settling what is at 
stake in speech. What they say about justice is connected to how they engage with one 
another. We have seen that Socratic irony is about investigating how we ground our 
questions, a power of discernment which sustains questioning as a progressive dialogic 
practice. Yet, to Thrasymachus, Socratic irony is simply a form of lying or betrayal. He 
insists that the inquiry into justice cannot proceed on the basis of Socratic irony, since he 
sets down his account like a ruler sets down the law. He understands that the logos has a 
technical quality, insofar as it can be likened to a process of production, and that one 
should simply surrender their engagement if problematic results follow from what has 
been said. We are shown this when Thrasymachus cedes to the analogy Socrates offers 
(REP 337 c). 
Yet, for Socrates utter abandonment of the inquiry, or the logos in general, is not 
an option, even when what is set down is still undecided, questionable and in need of 
interpretation. He does not defend the logos dogmatically, but allows it to interrogate 
itself in lived conversation. Furthermore, Socrates does not account for the logos in 
terms of a weapon, but in terms of another measure, a level of engagement with the most 
serious of topics that occurs on the level of friendship and mutual understanding. In this 
way, Socrates illustrates aspects of effective teaching, while Thrasymachus does not. 
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Concluding Remarks Alongside Glaucon's Desire 
I have shown that Polemarchus and Thrasymachus reveal their characters in how 
they discuss justice, and that this revelation determines their status as learners. 
Polemarchus cannot be a worthy student, because he lacks the capacity for following 
Socrates in the movement of the logos. His insistence on fulfilling his own opinions 
regarding justice, regardless of what is shown in conversation, makes him unable to 
stretch himself out toward learning. His opinions remain unquestionable foundations for 
his self-understanding instead of tentative springboards for mutual inquiry. 
Thrasymachus, on the other hand, despite how he relates to himself, is not a good 
instructor, because of his false expectations regarding the clarity and precision of the 
logos when it is set down by one who is stronger. He should not be followed by those 
who desire to learn, because he lacks a notion of learning as mutually beneficial to both 
student and teacher and refuses to witness the destructive power that predictive 
assumptions may have in conversation. He refuses to see himself as a student and only 
understands himself as a teacher in terms of the recipient of payment for knowledge 
imparted to students on an unquestioned basis. 
However, the thesis of this essay does not occur solely by way of negation. I will 
show that the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates regarding justice, as the lived 
life of the just, shows a proper relation between teacher and student that is positively 
expressed in contrast to Polemarchus' and Thrasymachus' conversations with Socrates. 
One of the main differences between all three characters is that Glaucon explicitly asserts 
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his desire for Socratic persuasion (REP 357 b). Earlier in this essay, I showed 
that Polemarchus does not even think that persuasion is a viable option to force, both 
rhetorical and physical. It is also clear that Thrasymachus does not become persuaded by 
Socrates' logos, since he remains unchanged with regard to his self-image as a ruling, 
strong, teacher. 
On the other hand, Glaucon does not have an account ofjustice that he wishes to 
express, he only admits that he is an open listener to an account that has so far remained 
unsaid. Specifically, Glaucon admits his desire by asking Socrates the following 
question," Do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly persuade us, that it is in 
every way better to be just than unjust" (REP 357 b). Glaucon asks a question that relies 
on a distinction between seeming and being, something that requires analysis beyond the 
scope of this essay. What is relevant for our discussion, however, is that Glaucon 
demands a Socratic task that involves inverting the common opinion that the unjust life is 
more worthy of choice than the just life. In his question, we see a shift in how the 
question ofjustice is framed, from being an account about dispensation or advantage to 
the betterment of being just in lived experience. The Socratic logos that Glaucon desires 
does indeed involve a revolutionary inversion of what has been said about justice 
previously, and shows a way to think of Glaucon as someone worthy of being called a 
student. 
Glaucon cannot thoroughly explain his desire for an account of the just life. He 
says, "I've been talked to deaf by Thrasymachus and countless others, while the 
argument on behalf ofjustice - that it is better than injustice - I've yet to hear from 
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anyone as I want it" (REP 358 d). In other words, Glaucon's educative 
upbringing has conditioned his understanding ofjustice and injustice with countless 
accounts which show the superiority of injustice over and against justice. His claim is 
ironic, in a way that mirrors Socratic irony, since he claims to be deafened by the talk of 
injustice, while still desiring to hear otherwise. He knows that the talk about the life of 
injustice is unsatisfactory, which means that he, in some way, knows what he wants to 
hear, even though he remains ignorant as to how such a speech would occur. His ability 
to admit of his own lack of understanding and his desire for it to become transformed 
further illustrates why he has the character of a student. Glaucon is willing to admit of 
being ignorant of his ignorance, which precisely marks what a student is. 
Glaucon continues this account regarding how his own education shows the 
profitability of injustice over justice in the following way, "They say that doing injustice 
is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but that the bad in suffering injustice far 
exceeds the good in doing it" (REP 358 e). This statement is extremely enigmatic, but 
not in regards to how common opinion asserts itself as unproblematic. In other words, 
common assertions about injustice are praises that are spoken without hesitation or need 
for clarification. Glaucon is able to speak on behalf of the unjust and just person with 
such agility and swiftness that Socrates becomes aghast and complements his speaking 
ability as a kind of polishing (REP 361 d). The disadvantageous consequences of 
suffering unjust acts pale in comparison to the rewards which unjust deeds may produce. 
Glaucon continues to speak on behalf of the greater profits of the unjust life and is 
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assisted in this task by Adeimantus' speeches, which seek to establish the same goal. We 
should mark how Socrates will respond in a way that shows why he is a good teacher. 
Socrates responds to these speeches about the life of injustice in a way that is 
directly indicative of his character, as a receptive and friendly conversationalist or 
teacher. He says: 
That, my friends, in my opinion is good. For something quite divine must 
certainly have happened to you, if you are remaining un-persuaded that 
injustice is better than justice when you are able to speak that way on its 
behalf. Now you truly don't seem to me to be being persuaded. I infer it 
from the rest of your character, since, on the basis of the arguments 
themselves, I would distrust you. And the more I trust you, the more I'm 
at a loss as to what I should to (REP 368 b). 
In other words, Socrates agrees with Glaucon that a straight forward, casual account of 
Glaucon's character is either unavailable or impossible. He says that if Glaucon and 
Adeimantus remain un-persuaded about a life of injustice, even though they are able to 
speak in such a polished way on its behalf, then the divine must have a role in forming 
their characters. I would like to suggest that we need not have faith in the divine in order 
to follow this Socratic response, because the function of the divine here is simply a 
further instantiation ofthe wonder felt by Socrates caused by Glaucon's character. 
Socrates also agrees that their education has been ineffective in persuading them, since he 
knows that they each have a character that is aligned with the just. Socrates' claims 
about the logos redeem his dialogic practice as progressively ironic, since he maintains 
trust in the power of the logos as a profound kind of disclosure into the deepest impasses, 
even when the unjust life becomes affirmed through speech. Even though he could lose 
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faith in the power of the logos to explain what is at stake in living justly, he says he 
would not lose trust in his familiarity with who Glaucon is. 
As our discussion comes to a close, I would like to briefly mention something 
about the cave image. I mentioned at the onset of this essay that Socrates articulates two 
different accounts of education in the cave image and we have not explored either one of 
them directly. The first account of education, one that we will not discuss or champion, 
articulates education as the direct placement of knowledge into the "soul"vi of the 
students in a way reminiscent of Thrasymachus' sophistical attitude. Socrates elaborates 
the other mode of education by saying, 
There would therefore be an art of this turning around, concerned with the 
way in which this power can most efficiently be turned around, not an art 
of producing sight in it. Rather, this art takes as given that sight is there, 
but not rightly turned nor looking at what it ought to look at. (REP, 518 d) 
In other words, this mode of education does not assert that knowledge is placed into the 
"soul" ofthe student, that the learning ofthe student can be measured in terms ofthe 
production of knowledge as linked to the production of a certain kind of sight in the 
student. Rather, this mode of education treats students as ends in themselves, complete in 
their capacities and potencies. Students do not lack knowledge, or the means to acquire 
it, but simply need help in empowering themselves in certain ways towards their own 
transformations. This type of education favors the inward movement of students, and is 
still considered a form of craft, even if nothing is produced externally between the 
student or the teacher. This account of teaching assumes that the power of sight, or of 
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inquiry in general, is already present in the student, but might not be turned to gaze in an 
appropriate manner, or may not have been appropriated by the student as their own. 
This model of education is operative in the conversation between Socrates and 
Glaucon. He describes their progress together as a kind of "the stupid state" which 
becomes more obscure as more is said (REP, 432 d). The kind oflearning that is 
happening here has to do with being attentive to how the logos conceals in its movement 
towards clarity. Learning has as much with being humble as it does with knowledge. 
Socrates wants us to reflect upon the paradoxical character of discursive inquiry and how 
this can affect us by changing how we relate to ourselves and each other, something that 
both Polemarchus and Thrasymachus ignore and negate in the analysis above. Neither 
Polemarchus nor Thrasymachus attends to the nearness ofjustice, which is precisely what 
Glaucon can see. 
One of the most dramatic scenes of the dialogue between Glaucon and Socrates 
occurs in Book IV during a discussion about linking justice to three different virtues: 
wisdom, courage and moderation. When the later is held up as being the virtue which 
can unite both city and human by the fact that it "stretches throughout the whole, from 
top to bottom of the entire scale", we are invited to think that the relation of these virtues 
to the city and citizen has to do with the relation between parts and whole (REP, 432 a). 
Socrates tells Glaucon that they have arrived at a decisive proximity to the topic of their 
conversation, which is justice. He says, "We must, like hunters, now station ourselves in 
a circle around the thicket and pay attention so that justice doesn't slip through 
somewhere and disappear into obscurity" (REP, 432 c). In other words, Socrates thinks 
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that the closeness to justice, which has been granted by the logos, necessitates a particular 
danger of obscurity, since this closeness is the very thing that allows justice get away 
from being seen or understood. Here, Socrates points to how their inquiry is constantly 
withdrawing within the intimacy that the dialogue provides. We should recall that 
Glaucon's name means owl_eyesVii and that this Socratic warning has to do with 
teamwork in the form of mutual discernment. 
He continues by saying, "Look to it and make every effort to catch sight of it; you 
might somehow be able to see it before me and could tell me" (REP, 432 c). In other 
words, Socrates desires Glaucon's companionship as an active participant in this inquiry. 
Socrates seeks a student who already holds a particularly powerful potency of sight, 
which he himselflacks. By addressing Glaucon as one who can see, Socrates admits that 
he cannot inquire into justice all by himself. Socrates continues to illustrate this cave-like 
situation by saying that, "The place really appears to be hard going and steeped in 
shadows ...At least its dark and hard to search out" (REP, 432 c). For our purposes, 
giving an inter-textual reading of the cave image, the language of this passage is 
interesting. Here, Socrates says that each member of the conversation has entered a cave 
by virtue of following what is revealed in speech. His claim further articulates why the 
inquiry into justice is most serious, because it is most difficult and hard going. 
This also connects to our previous discussion involving how Thrasymachus 
relates to the logos and Socratic irony, since this passage shows that while Socrates can 
discern problematic insights which result from attentively following the movement of 
speech, he still thinks that these consequences should not render discursive inquiry 
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irrelevant. Indirectly, Socrates says that the work achieved by the logos so far has only 
given clarity regarding what is obscure, and this obscurity is a direct result from the 
proximity towards justice that the logos has provided. In other words, Socrates is 
attentive to how speech obscures in its movement towards clarity. Both Glaucon and 
Socrates urge each other to go on and even when Socrates becomes excited at the sight of 
the just he immediately reverses himself when praised by Glaucon at reporting such good 
news. Much to Glaucon's amazement, he states that they have remained in a very stupid 
state throughout this conversation (REP, 432 d). This mistaken condition constitutes the 
very character of both the student and teacher, while also demonstrates that learning 
entails an awareness of our own ignorance. 
Proper education is about learning that we are mostly ignorant of our ignorance. 
This learning occurs most potently in conversational dialogue with others regarding 
serious matters, which in this case has been the discussion ofjustice. We have seen that 
asking what justice is occurs at the level of who we think we are. We reveal our 
character, as capable oflearning or not, when discussions occur in a open manner. We 
can be guided towards our inward revolutions only if we remain receptive to the fact that 
speech can conceal as much as it can reveal about a topic. The mark of an educated 
person lies in the ability to learn what is worthy of discussion, finding the serious matters 
of dialogue, and being able to speak about the difficulties inherent in them well 
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Endnotes 
i Many scholars, most notably Jacob Klein and Drew Hyland articulate the importance of the reader's 
participation in Platonic dialogue. In A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Klein asserts the following about the 
role of the reader as participant in the dialogue itself, "A dialogue, then, presupposes people listening to the 
conversation, not as casual & indifferent spectators, but as silent participants." 
Klein, Jacob. A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965, p.5. 
While Hyland's work has done a great deal to undermine the tradition of Platonism by articulating the role 
of the reader and the dramatic quality of the dialogues. "Nothing in the dialogues advocates that we take 
these positions as ones actually espoused by Plato, and everything about the dialogues suggests that they 
are presented for our thoughtful consideration and evaluation". 
Hyland, Drew. Questioning Platonism, Albany: State University ofNew York, 2004, p.6. 
ii All Platonic text will be referred to by Stephenus numeration in the future. 
iii It is interesting to note that the notion of war forms a central part of the just city, since only when a city is
 
at war can we see it most alive and in motion (REP, 374 a).
 
iv By doing so, Socrates embodies Aristotle's account of the virtue of courage in the Nichomachean Ethics.
 
As he says "courage lies in the ability to endure pain well, in the face of life-threatening fear"
 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs. Newburyport: Focus Publishing/R Pullins Company,
 
2002, 1002 b. 
v Here we see another instance of the necessity of the reader's participation in the dialogue. Irony is an 
invitation to the reader to think about how Socratic speech is connected to Socratic practice. As Klein 
suggests, "Everything about Socrates' irony depends on the presence of other people who are capable of 
catching the irony, of hearing what is not said" 
Klein, Jacob. A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 
1965, p.6. 
vi See Chapter 2 on a detailed analysis of Aristotle's discussion of "soul", why it is placed in scare quotes 
here, and how Aristotle's language is beneficial to a rich notion of learning. 
vii Sallis, John. Being and Logos, Atlantic Hights: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1986, p. 319. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
OTS	 Aristotle. On the Soul, trans. Joe Sachs. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 
2001. 
PO Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy ofthe Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. 
New York: Continuum,1970. 
REP Plato. Republic, trans. Alan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1968. 
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